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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs who bring tort claims against those who have sexually abused them as
children often face a formidable legal obstacle: the pertinent civil statute of
limitations. ' Plaintiffs have attempted to sidestep statutes of limitations by claiming
these statutes were "tolled" because they had repressed the knowledge of their sexual
injuries and had only recently "discovered" them. 2 Other victims of abuse have
claimed that, though they were cognizant of their abuse, they failed to connect their
emotional injuries with their abuse until they received therapy as adults; therefore, they
argue that "discovery" rules should apply. 3 Although sympathetic to these victims'
plight, courts typically have refused to apply discovery rules and allow these tort
actions. 4
In deciding these cases, courts often discuss the policies behind statutes of
limitations.5 These policies include: Concern that evidence will become stale, lost, or
destroyed if actions are delayed; 6 recognition of judicial economy by limiting the time
to bring claims;7 the possibility of continuing "blackmail" by potential plaintiffs; 8
perceived unfairness to potential defendants who may be forced to defend themselves
long after the alleged act;9 the concept of grace;' 0 and recognition of self-reformation
by potential defendants. "t
It is the legislature's role to balance these policies and to determine the length
of statutes of limitations.1 2 Injuries likely to become known to a plaintiff with relative
1. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1369-70
(N.D. Ill. 1988); State v. Bentley, 239 Kan. 334, 339, 721 P.2d 227, 230 (1986); Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72,
76-80,727 P.2d 226, 228-30 (1986); Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257,264-67, 418 N.W. 2d 23, 26-27 (1987).
2. See supra note I (cases cited). The discovery rule generally states that a statute of limitations does not run until
a victim discovers, or with reasonable care should discover, his injury. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 168-71 (1949).
3. E.g., DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1017-18, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371 (1987); Raymond v.
Ingram, 47 Wash. App. 781, 785-86, 737 P.2d 314, 316-17 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Smith, 830 F.2d at 13; Bentley, 239 Kan. at 339, 721 P.2d at 230; Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 79-80,
727 P.2d at 230. But see Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363; Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23.
5. See Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 75-76, 727 P.2d at 227-28 (Goodloe, J., concurring); Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d at
267, 418 N.W.2d at 27.
6. "The purpose of the various statutes of limitations in law is to require one to present his claim before evidence
to rebut it is apt to be destroyed or lost." City of Houston v. Bergstrom, 468 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
7. People v. Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d 538, 547, 557 P.2d 75, 81, 134 Cal. Rptr. 784, 790 (1976).
8. Id.
9. See id. at 546, 557 P.2d at 80, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 789; Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 75-76, 727 P.2d at 228.
10. See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 223, at 573-74
n.88 (1961) (cases cited).
11. "There comes a time when [the defendant] ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has
been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim when 'evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.' " Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 201, 293 A.2d
662, 667-68 (1972) (quoting Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950)).
See also Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d at 547, 557 P.2d at 81, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
12. See Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 80, 727 P.2d at 230 (Goodloe, J., concurring); Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d
257, 267, 418 N.W.2d 23, 27 (1987). The Hammer court quoted the trial court judge: "'The legislature is free to carve
out an exception for cases of incestuous abuse involving minors in Chapter 893 of the Wisconsin Statutes." Id. at 264,
418 N.W.2d at 25. See also Fuschberg, Our Court Disposes, Defendant Reposes, 14 TRIAL LAW. Q. 3, 4 (1982).
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speed, such as those resulting from defamation or assault and battery, are afforded
short statutes of limitations.' 3 Injuries that might not become apparent for some time,
such as those resulting from breach of contract or negligence, have longer statutes of
limitations or are governed by discovery rules. 14 Legislatures have enacted tolling
statutes that allow a plaintiff to proceed with an otherwise barred action,' 5 based on
justifications such as continued relationship,' 6 minority,1 7 mental incapacity, 18 or
fraud by the defendant. 19
Some judges believe courts should play a more active role in interpreting the
boundaries of discovery rules, particularly in cases involving child sexual abuse. 20 A
Wisconsin appellate court recently allowed a woman sexually abused as a child to
bring an action against her father after the statute of limitations had run.2 1 The court
applied discovery rules so as to allow the claim. 22 Moreover, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently allowed a person sexually abused as an adult
to bring an action after the statute of limitations for personal injuries had run. 23 The
court held that her cause of action accrued only upon her being advised by her
psychiatrist that the abuse had been the cause of her emotional injuries. 24 In addition,
a number of legal commentators have recommended that the discovery rules apply to
child sexual abuse actions brought by now-adult victims. 25
Given the prevalence of child sexual abuse,26 the issues these cases present will
be considered by an increasing number of state and federal courts. 27 This Note
13. See generally Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1184-88 (1986);
Rubinfeld, On Determining the Optimal Magnitude and Length of Liability in Torts, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 551, 558 (1984).
14. See supra notes 1-2. See also Epstein, supra note 13, at 1183 n. 19.
15. Epstein, supra note 13, at 1183 n.19.
16. See Comment, The Continuous Treatment Doctrine: A Toll on the Statute of Limitations for Medical
Malpractice in New York, 49 ALB. L. REv. 64 (1984).
17. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Bergstrom, 468 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); Hammer v. Hammer,
142 Wis. 2d 257, 264, 418 N.W.2d 23, 25 (1987) (see supra note 12 for quote).
18. See Annotation, Time of Existence of Mental Incompetency Which Will Prevent or Suspend Running of Statute
of Limitations, 41 A.L.R.2d 726 (1955).
19. See Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and the
Long-Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 191, 197 (1985).
20. State v. Bentley, 239 Kan. 334, 341, 721 P.2d 227, 231 (1986) (Herd, J., dissenting); Tyson v. Tyson, 107
Wash. 2d 72, 90, 727 P.2d 226, 235 (1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting).
21. Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987).
22. Id. at 264, 418 N.W.2d at 26.
23. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1986).
24. Id. at 1368.
25. See Note, Statutes ofLimitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. \G.%i-N's L.J.
189 (1984). See also Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 609, 628-31 (1983);
Comment, Adult Incest Survivors, supra note 19, at 195-97.
26. The National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse states that "[rletrospective studies of adult populations
estimate that anywhere from 15% to 38% of females suffered some form of sexual maltreatment prior to reaching the age
of eighteen; the number of male victims is often cited at 10%." National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse, A
Fact Sheet: The Most Frequently 'Asked-About' Issues Regarding Child Abuse and Neglect (1988). See also Pierce &
Pierce, The Sexually Abused Child: A Comparison of Male and Female Victims, in 9 CILD ABUSE AND NEGLECt 191,
191-92 (1985). Child sexual abuse for purposes of this Note is defined as "contacts or interactions between a child and
an adult when the child is being used as an object of gratification for adult sexual needs or desires." Note, Minnesota's
Hearsay Exception for Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 11 Wst. MrrCHELL L. REv. 799, 799 n. 1 (1985) (quoting SExuAL
ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECrED READINGS 1 (1980)).
27. In fact, there may be wrestling among each other; the court in Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th
Cir. 1986), expressly took an opposite position to the Washington Supreme Court.
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suggests a legal approach to these issues, other than expanding discovery rules, that
would allow more sexually abused children to bring personal injury claims, even after
they have reached adulthood. Relying on a line of United States Supreme Court cases
starting with Mills v. Habluetzel,28 this Note will show that short personal injury
statutes of limitations for child sexual abuse injuries may be challenged as
unconstitutional. While recognizing the oft stated policies for statutes of limitations,
these cases consider other factors in determining the constitutional validity of a statute
of limitations and provide courts a rationale to recognize those factors of child sexual
abuse that keep now-adult victims from taking timely legal action. 29 Part II of this
Note discusses these factors and why courts should recognize the special impact of
child sexual abuse on individuals and their subsequent inability to redress these
wrongs. Part HI asserts that judicial recognition of these factors should lead to a
"heightened" constitutional evaluation of tort statutes of limitations for child sexual
abuse claims under the equal protection clause. Finally, Part IV concludes that short
statutes of limitations for child sexual abuse claims violate equal protection and must
be lengthened to remedy that violation. 30
II. THE REALITIES OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
Society's awareness of child sexual abuse has increased dramatically in the last
few years. 3' The American Humane Association estimates that there are 200,000 to
300,000 child sexual abuse cases per year.32 National Committee for the Prevention
of Child Abuse statistics show that 315,000 child sexual abuse cases were officially
reported in 1987. 33 National extrapolations from an intensive study in Santa Clara
County, California, indicate that there may be as many as 400,000 cases of child
sexual abuse each year.34
The psychological trauma35 of sexual abuse is recognized by the American
Psychiatric Association. In 1980, the Association incorporated into its Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders the term "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,"
which encompasses child sexual abuse.36 A knowledge of this disorder is important
to a discussion of laws limiting child sexual abuse litigation.
28. 456 U.S. 91 (1982). Mills held that a one-year period for establishing paternity denies equal protection of the
law to illegitimate children. Id. at 101.
29. See infra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
31. Walker & Edwall, Domestic Violence and Determination of Visitation and Custody in Divorce, in DoMEsTIc
VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL ANDLEGAL DiMmNstoNS OF FAILY VIOLENCE 127, 135 (D. Sonkin ed. 1987); Kerns,
The Pediatric Perspective, in FOUNDATIONS OF CHItD ADVOCACY 23, 33 (D. Bross & L. Michaels eds. 1987).
32. Kerns, supra note 31, at 33.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. "Trauma" is defined as "an injury to the body or psyche by some type of shock, violence or unanticipated
situation." R. BARKER, THE SOCIAL VoRK DIcTIoNARY 166 (1987).
36. See J. JACOBSEN, PSYCHIATRIC SEQUALAE OF CHILD ABUSE 111 (1986) (describing the "child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome"); C. SCRIGNAR, POST-TRAumATiC STRESS DISORDER: DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, AND LEGAL ISSUES
138 (1984). See also Keri v. State, 179 Ga. App. 664, 665, 347 S.E.2d 236, 237 (1986) (therapist allowed to testify on
child abuse accommodation syndrome); Am. PSYCHIATRIC A., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF DISORDERS § 309.89
at 247 (3d rev. ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-InI-R]; PROTECTION OF ABUSED VIcTIts: STATE LAWS AND DECISIONS 110-I1
(1982) [hereinafter ABUSED VICTIMs] (describing the "sexually abused child syndrome").
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The term "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder" (PTSD) is used to describe the
psychological impact of traumatic events on a person. 37 The disorders resulting from
these events may be either a combination of physical and mental disorders, or solely
a residual mental incapacity continuing after a physical injury has healed. 38 PTSD can
exist even when a trauma victim has not suffered demonstrable physical injury. 39 A
sexually abused child who suffers from this disorder may exhibit symptoms of
unnatural secrecy, feelings of helplessness or entrapment, delayed or conflicting
disclosure, retraction, and various phobias. 40 A practical consequence is that the child
may repress or delay disclosing the sexual abuse until after the pertinent personal
injury statute of limitations has run.
The possibility of the sexually abused child suffering from a PTSD increases
when her4 1 sexual abuser is (and he often is) a parent42 or other trusted adult, 43 such
as a relative or family friend.44 In one study of 583 child sexual abuse cases, the
offender was a family member in forty-seven percent of the cases, an acquaintance
in forty-two percent of the cases, and a stranger in only eight percent of the cases. 45
The abuse twists the child's perception of normality in relationships 46 and breaks
down the child's ability to trust others. 47 The intimacy of the sexual acts further
accentuates the intertwined mind and body damage the child suffers due to the
abuse. 48
The child's damaged psyche and weakened ability to perceive right and wrong49
37. DSM-III-R, supra note 36, at 247-48.
38. Id. at 247-51; Lindberg & Distad, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders in Women Who Experienced Childhood
Incest, in 9 CHILD ABUSE AND NEoLECr 329, 329-30 (1985).
39. C. SCRIGNAR, supra note 36, at 138.
40. Id. See also J. JACOBSEN, supra note 36, at 113; Lindberg & Distad, supra note 38, at 334.
41. HEW statistics show that 90% of child sexual abuse victims are females from infants through adolescents.
NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 75-30073,
in 1 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT 7 (1976) [hereinafter CHILD ABUSE PRoBLEmt]. National
studies show that in 1982, 83% of child sexual abuse cases involved females. A. RUSSELL & C. TRAINOR, TRENDs IN CHn.D
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 106 (1984). In recognition of this fact, this Note will use feminine pronouns
when refering to sexual abuse victims.
42. G. THOImAN, INCEsTUOUS FAMILIES 138 (1983); Becker & Abel, The Rights and Treatment of the Sexually
Abused Client, in PRESERVATION OF CLIENT RIHTS 136, 143 (G. Hannah, W. Christian & H. Clark eds. 1981).
43. Approximately 75% of sexual offenders, usually males, are known to the child or the child's family. CrML
ABUSE PROBLEM, supra note 41, at 7. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CHILD MOLESTATION I
(1984) [hereinafter Symp'oSIUm]; A. RUSSELL & C. TRAINOR, supra note 41, at 98; Kerns, supra note 31, at 34; National
studies show that in 1982, 30% of child sexual abuse cases involved a parent or a relative. Id.
44. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 806, 807 n.14 (1985).
45. Id.
46. Children are taught from an early age to be obedient to adults. They learn that if they do what the adult
tells them to do, they will be rewarded by gaining the adult's approval. Not to obey an adult may result in
punishment.... [O]ffenders can pressure children into sexual activity by telling them that it is 'okay to do.'
... In the case of a 30-year-old boyfriend of the mother who lived with the family, the six-year-old daughter
was told, '[g]ood girls do what their Daddy tells them to do.' The reward in this situation, for over a six-year
period, was the gain of the father-surrogate's approval.
A. BURGESS, A. GROTH, L. HoMrrRom & S. SGROI, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 86-87 (1978)
[hereinafter A. BURGESS]. ee also G. THORMAN, supra note 42, at 138.
47. G. THORmAN, supra note 42, at 139.
48. Kerns, supra note 31, at 33.
49. See A. BURGESS, supra note 46; M. CHESTERMAN, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND SOCIAL WvORK 3 (Social Work
Monograph No. 33, 1985).
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hinders the child from taking self-protective measures. It is fundamental that in order
for a person to take action for a wrong, that person must perceive it as a wrong.5 0
Even after she perceives the wrong, she must also distinguish what kind of wrong it
is-a moral wrong, a social wrong, or a legal wrong-in order to take appropriate
action. 51 The sexually abused child's world is very often a confused one and thus she
may be greatly disabled both in her ability to perceive wrongs52 and to take
appropriate legal action.5 3 The people she normally should be able to trust for
protection and moral guidance are often the ones hurting her. 54
The child's pain or pleasure from the sexual abuse may further confuse her
perception of her abuse, her abuser, and her relationship to the abuser.55 This
confusion may be compounded by any conflicting verbal information she receives.
The abuser may tell the child that this conduct is normal and is an act of love.56 The
abuser may also threaten that harm will come to the child or someone she loves if she
tells anyone about the abuse.57 The child's confusion and fear work to the abuser's
benefit. The abuse may continue unnoticed and more time will pass before the child
reestablishes emotional and psychological equilibrium and takes protective action.5 8
A victim may be years into her adulthood before she acknowledges and deals
with her sexual abuse as a child. 59 Even when a victim recognizes and acknowledges
her abuser's conduct, she may not understand how that conduct has damaged her.6°
A sexual abuse victim often needs a psychiatrist to discover the existence, nature,
cause, and extent of her injuries. 6' By the time she sees a therapist, it is often too late;
the applicable statute of limitations has run.62
The sexual abuse victim has understandable reasons for delay in seeing a
50. L. HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND THE STATE: A NORMATIVE THEORY OF JUVENILE RIGHTS 70 (1980).
51. Id.
52. As one woman said, in recounting her childhood experience with her father, 'I think the reason why a lot
of kids don't do anything, don't tell anybody, is because an adult is an authority figure, and somehow they have
been forced to do something wrong by an authority, and therefore it must have been right.'
A. BURGESS, supra note 46, at 89. See also G. THORMtAN, supra note 42, at 139; M. CHEsERIAN, supra note 49, at 3.
53. "Laura had not perceived the incestuous conduct as injurious because (1) it was of such a long duration and
frequency that it had been perceived by her as natural behavior .... - Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 262, 418
N.W.2d 23, 25 (1987).
54. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. See generally G. THORSIAN, supra note 42. The offender is
typically a family member, and other family members often acquiesce in protecting the offender.
55. M. CHESTERIAN, supra note 49, at 4; Thorton, Preface to I NEvR ToLD ANYONE: iWRITINGS BY WOMEN
SURVIVORS OFCHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 15, 19 (E. Bass & L. Thornton 1st ed. 1983); Steele & Alexander, The Long Term
Effects of Sexual Abuse in Childhood, in SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN A D THEIR FAMIUES 223, 228 (P. Mrazek & C.
Kempe 1st ed. 1981).
56. A. BURGESS, supra note 46, at 86-87.
57. "Sexual abuse is in the nature of a violent physical assault. Any victim of intrafamilial abuse is likely to view
the perpetrator as unpredictable and threatening." State v. French, 392 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting
the trial court).
"[T]hreats are commonplace in sexual assaults on children." State v. Bentley, 239 Kan. 334, 335, 721 P.2d 227,
227 (1986). See also SYItOslIOI, supra note 43, at 2.
58. SYiuOStt si, supra note 43, at 1. See generally A. BURGESS, supra note 46.
59. See supra note 1 (cases cited). See also J. JACOBSEN, supra note 36, at 117.
60. Paulson, Strouse & Chaleff, Intrafamilial Incest and Sexual Molestation of Children, in THE RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOoICAL PERsPEcnvEs 39, 56-60 (J. Henning ed. 1982).
61. Id.
62. See Bentley, 239 Kan. at 341, 721 P.2d at 231; Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 89, 727 P.2d 226, 235
(1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting).
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therapist. The victim is naturally reluctant to find out or confirm that someone she
trusted has wronged her. 63 She may blame herself for her abuser's conduct. 64 The
sexual abuse victim may fear the consequences of exposure. 65 She may think or may
have been told that she will have to leave the family.6 6 She may even fear that a
therapist will not believe her.67 These fears and insecurities work to delay both
therapy and legal action.
Even though the legal period for the victim's action may end, her sexual abuse
will continue to play a dramatic part in her adulthood. 68 The victim is often riddled
with shame, guilt, embarrassment, and fear.69 Her ability to trust and develop
relationships with the opposite sex may be severely hindered. 70 Of course, the effect
of the abuse on her sexual attitudes is most devastating. In one study, eighty-seven
percent of young female victims of father-daughter incest had serious sexual
problems as adults with prostitution, promiscuity, and orgasmic dysfunction. 7'
Tolling a statute of limitations until the age of majority is no answer to these
problems. 72 The law presumes that upon reaching majority the child understands
enough about herself, the wrong, its nature, and the law to file an action against her
abuser. 73 This presumption incorrectly assumes that the age of majority is the age of
maturity. 74 The child may have knowledge of the sexual acts. However, the child
needs the maturity to know how to act on that knowledge. If a child is abused most
of her "under majority" life, her maturity and her psyche are often drastically
affected.
In addition, the practical difficulties facing a person sexually abused as a child
do not disappear when she reaches the age of majority. As noted, the typical victim
63. See Becker & Abel, supra note 42, at 144.
64. A. BURGESS, supra note 46, at 88-90.
65. Psychologists have identified the following fears and factors that keep children from disclosing the abuse: I)
fear of punishment; 2) fear of not being believed; 3) fear of being blamed; 4) fear of abandonment or rejection; 5) fear
of or belief in the authority of adults; and 6) communication barrier in discussing sexual acts when unfamiliar with
terminology. Id. at 88-90.
66. Id.
67. In one national study on the incidence and severity of child abuse and neglect it was found that "two thirds of
[abuse] cases were not reported to the appropriate authorities even though a professional source-mandated by law to
report child maltreatment-had identified the child as maltreated." A. Russ.L & C. TRAINOR, supra note 41, at 14. For
an example of one woman's experience, see Thorton, supra note 55, at 18. One Pennsylvania court found as fact that:
"Reports by children of incest or rape to family members or public authorities are viewed as suspect by those to whom
the event is reported because adults frequently perceive that children tend to imagine or fantasize the event." Fischer v.
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 85 Pa. Commw. 215, 227, 482 A.2d 1137, 1142 (1984).
68. Paulson, Strouse & Chaleff, supra note 60, at 42-43. See also J. JACOBSEN, supra note 36, at 115-26 (finding
the three classifications of problems resulting from incest: relational imbalance, increased intergenemrtional risk, and
symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder); M. CHEsrEWMAN, supra note 49, at 3.
69. Paulson, Strouse & Chaleff, supra note 60, at 43.
70. G. THORiAN, supra note 42, at 139; Steele & Alexander, supra note 55, at 227-29.
71. Paulson, Strouse & Chaleff, supra note 60, at 43.
72. The need for maturity of the survivor before she can confront her childhood incest experience results in
a general lack of ability to file suit within the statutory period.... As has been seen, the maximum age at which
an adult survivor of incest may file suit in this state is 21. Since many survivors are simply incapable of
discovering a cause of action by the time they are 21 years old, they are effectively denied a legal remedy unless
they are given the benefit of the discovery rule.
Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 89, 727 P.2d 226, 235 (1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 92-93, 727 P.2d at 236.
74. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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is abused by someone she knows and trusts. 75 These relationships do not necessarily
end upon a victim's reaching the age of eighteen, particularly if the abuser is a parent.
Many people still live at home at the age of eighteen.76 They may have the right to
vote and drink alcohol, but they may still rely on their parents for shelter, food, and
transportation. Children who rely on their parents for these necessities are, for all
practical purposes, under their parents' control. They may feel forced to stay in a
sexually abusive environment until they can gain financial independence.
In addition to financial dependence, the continuing emotional attachment to the
abuser77 may also delay a victim's legal action. It is very difficult to take a relative
or close acquaintance to court and expose the sordid and embarrassing details of the
abuse. The suit will have obvious implications for the child's future relationship with
the parent, relative, or close acquaintance. Moreover, the potential effect of litigation
on innocent family members and third parties, who may be unaware of the abuse, is
a factor in delaying action for many victims. 78
One woman's experience best summarizes the many factors that may contribute
to late legal action by a child sexual abuse victim:
Laura had not perceived the incestuous conduct as injurious because (1) it was of such a long
duration and frequency that it had been perceived by her as natural behavior; (2) Warren [her
father] had imposed isolation and secrecy on her; (3) the abuse had depersonalizing effects
which had made her think of herself as an object to be used rather than as a person with
rights; (4) she had been told by her father that the conduct was normal and his right, and (5)
the abuse by an authority figure on whom she was dependent had made her distrustful of
other authority figures who might have helped her.79
The unique plight of people sexually abused as children, the potential effects of
post-traumatic stress disorders8o on their ability to acknowledge and understand their
injuries, s 1 and the practical factors that inhibit them from taking action upon reaching
majority are all important reasons why tort statutes of limitations as applied to child
abuse cases should be constitutionally reexamined.
75. Approximately 78% of sexual abuse and molestation takes place within the home by members of either the
nuclear or extended family. Paulson, Strouse & Chaleff, supra note 60, at 42.
76. This may be particularly true where the child comes from an impoverished background. According to 1983
statistics, 22% of all children under 18 live in poverty. The child's options for financial support and thus the ability to
move away from home upon reaching 18 may be slim or none. For a breakdown of these statistics, see Cook & Laub,
Trends in Child Abuse and Juvenile Delinquency, in 2 FRo.i CmLDREN TO CrmzEs: THE ROLE OF THE JuvE tLE COURT 109,
122 (F. Hartmann ed. 1987).
77. See supra note 43.
78. "In addition to disorders in personality development, victims frequently feel to blame for the incarceration of
the father, for break up of the family, and for the stigma the community directs to the victimized family." Paulson,
Strouse & Chaleff, supra note 60, at 43.
79. Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 262, 418 N.W.2d 23, 25 (1987).
80. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL EVALUATION UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS FOR CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE LITIGATION
"Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect." ' 2
By failing to account for the distinctive obstacles to taking legal action
encountered by child sexual abuse victims, personal injury statutes of limitations may
violate equal protection. To show that a statute violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the state has created arbitrary and
unreasonable distinctions by treating similarly situated plantiffs differently, or by
treating dissimilarly situated plaintiffs similarly.8 3 This Note maintains that states
treat dissimilarly situated people similarly when the same personal injury statute of
limitations applies to plaintiffs sexually abused as children as to plaintiffs sexually
violated as adults.8 4
The level of review given to a statute under the equal protection clause depends
upon the nature of the statute. If it involves social or economic legislation, the
Supreme Court generally applies a "rational basis" level of scrutiny.85 That is, the
statute will stand unless there is no rational relation between a legitimate legislative
objective and the means selected by the legislature to achieve that objective. 86 If the
statute involves gender or illegitimacy, and in some cases alienage, the Court will
apply a type of intermediate level review.8 7 For the statute to be upheld under
intermediate level review, the means chosen by the legislature must serve an
important governmental objective and be substantially related to the achievement of
that objective.88 If the statute is based upon a suspect classification, such as race, or
if it impairs a fundamental right, the Court will apply a "strict scrutiny" standard of
review. 89 The classification will be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest.90
As noted, the majority of equal protection cases are analyzed under rational basis
scrutiny and the Court has applied greater scrutiny in only a limited number of areas.
One of the areas to which the Supreme Court has applied greater scrutiny is
illegitimacy. The Supreme Court cases which have considered this area provide
strong reasons for the application of intermediate level scrutiny to statutes of
82. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
83. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 1438-39 (1988).
84. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
85. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1988).
86. Id.
87. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (illegitimacy); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 723-24 & n. 9 (1982) (gender); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender); Matthews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976) (illegitimacy).
88. See supra note 87 (cases cited).
89. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-88 (1978) (marriage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(race); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (voting); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369-74 (1886) (alienage).
90. See supra note 89 (cases cited).
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limitations that block damage actions for sexual injuries suffered as a child. These
cases are Clark v. Jeter,9 1 Pickett v. Brown,92 and Mills v. Habluetzel.93
In Jeter, the Court stated that it "has developed a particular framework for
evaluating equal protection challenges to statutes of limitations that apply to suits to
establish paternity, and thereby limit the ability of illegitimate children to obtain
support.'94 The Court used a two-step analysis:
First, the period for obtaining support... must be sufficiently long in duration to present
a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their
behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related
to the state's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. 95
In Pickett, the Court considered whether a two-year Tennessee limitations period
for paternity and child support actions, brought on behalf of certain illegitimate
children, afforded a reasonable opportunity to bring such suits. 96 The Court deemed
the emotional condition of the mother of the illegitimate child to be extremely
significant in determining the constitutional adequacy of the statute's time period.97
The Court stated:
The mother may experience financial difficulties caused not only by the child's birth, but
also by a loss of income attributable to the need to care for the child. Moreover, 'continuing
affection for the child's father, a desire to avoid disapproval of family and community, or
the emotional strain and confusion that often attend the birth of an illegitimate child,'...
may inhibit a mother from filing a paternity suit on behalf of the child within two years after
the child's birth. 98
The duration of the mother's condition was also important in the Court's
consideration of the validity of the statute of limitations. 99 The Court stated that the
statute did not provide an adequate opportunity for the mother to recover in time to
take legal action.100 Quoting Justice O'Connor's opinion in Mills,10 t the Pickett Court
stated these "practical obstacles to filing suit within one year of birth could as easily
exist several years after the birth of the illegitimate child."102 In Clark, the Supreme
Court followed Pickett and Mills and held that six years was too short a period to
remove "practical obstacles" to filing suit for support. 103
If it can be perceived that the mother of an illegitimate child cannot emotionally
recover within six years from pregnancy to file suit (even though the mother may be
over eighteen), it should be easy to accept the proposition that a sexually abused child
91. 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988), rev'g and remanding 358 Pa. Super. 550, 518 A.2d 276 (1986).
92. 462 U.S. 1 (1983).
93. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
94. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. at 1914.
95. Id. (citing Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1982)).
96. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1982).
97. Id. at 12-13.
98. Id. (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 100 (1982)).
99. Id. at 13.
100. Id. at 12-13.
101. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 103 (1982).
102. 462 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (emphasis added).
103. Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1915 (1988).
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cannot emotionally recover within the appropriate legal period to file suit for her
injuries. Many of the practical obstacles mentioned in Pickett o4 exist for people
sexually abused as children. The factors mentioned by the Court, such as confusion,
fear of family and community disapproval, emotional strain, and possible continuing
affection, are present a fortiori in child sexual abuse cases.' 0 5 As mentioned
previously, the Court in Pickett recognized that these obstacles can exist for years and
can preclude a person from filing suit within the statutory time limit. '0 6
As noted, short personal injury statutes of limitations do not allow for the
practical obstacles to taking legal action encountered by child sexual abuse victims,
the distinctiveness of sexual injuries sustained as a child, and their continuing impact
through adulthood. 107 These statutes impermissibly treat people sexually abused as
children the same as those sexually violated as adults. ' 08
A sexual injury to a child deserves to be distinguished from other types of
injuries. Sexual abuse involves the most intimate aspects of a child's person: the
perpetrator has preyed upon the special vulnerabilities of a child. 09 Although initially
physical, the child's injuries are unique in their mental aspects. "10 Sexual abuse of a
child often continues for years. "'t Generally, a sexual wrong to an adult is performed
over a much shorter period of time. Arguably, any victim's outlook on life changes
after the crime, but a child's outlook is uniquely developing."t 2 Her abilities to relate
to and to trust others are in the process of being formed. " 3 An adult sexual abuse
victim is presumably more developed in her self-perception when the sexual attack
happens, whereas child sexual abuse occurs when the victim is still developing her
identity. 114 Thus, the sexual abuse's impact upon the child is different in its formative
104. See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
105. See supra notes 37-78 and accompanying text.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 111-22.
109. See, e.g., Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 91-94, 727 P.2d 226, 234-37 (1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting).
In many cases it could be classified as fraudulent, in that the perpetrator (often a family member or trusted acquaintance)
misrepresents his fiduciary nature, the child relies on the misrepresentation, and is subsequently injured.
110. Id.
111. ABUSED VitiMs, supra note 36, at 135. Hunter, Kilstrom & Loda, Sexually Abused Children: Identif'ing
Masked Presentations in a Medical Setting, in 9 CHtIL ABUSE AND NEGLECr 17, 23 (1985) (reporting that "when detected,
sexual abuse in children has frequently been ongoing for an average of two to three years.").
112. Many mental health professionals agree that the reactions of adolescent rape victims are in many ways
similar to the reactions of adult victims, but emphasize that there are important differences that must be
recognized in treating teenage rape victims. Primary among these differences are the developmental tasks of
adolescence which complicate recovery.
Otey, Adolescent Victims of Rape, 6 RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAmiLY & SEXUAL ASSAULT 7 (1983).
113. Id.
114. Id. The average age of a child sexual abuse victim according to one study was 10 years old. A. RUSSELL & C.
TRAINOR, supra note 41, at 106. See also Pierce & Pierce, supra note 26, at 193. In one report of child sexual abuse cases
from 1979-1985, one third of the children were ages birth to six, one third were ages seven to twelve, and one third were
ages thirteen to eighteen. Incest accounted for approximately 50% of the cases. J. JAcOBsEE, supra note 36, at 101.
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role than sexual injuries to an adult. 115 The child does not automatically shed herself
of the formative impact of sexual abuse upon reaching adulthood. 116
Admittedly, some factors found in child sexual abuse cases can also be found in
adult sexual abuse cases, such as the trust of and submission to authority figures." 17
In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently tolled a statute
of limitations for a woman abused by her psychologist, based upon her abuser's
position of authority.' 8 The court described the relationship as a "symbolic, some-
times conscious sometimes not, parent-child relationship."" 19 There may be similar-
ities between adult and child sexual abuse victims, but there are also important
distinctions.
It is logical for courts to treat injuries sustained as a child differently from
injuries sustained as an adult. The Supreme Court has already recognized that
children have unique disabilities as compared to adults. 20 Their mental capabilities
have been understood to be less than those of adults.' 2 ' The Court has also noted their
vulnerability, limited knowledge, and limited experience. 22
To find evidence that children are treated differently by the law, we need only
to look at our juvenile courts. The punishment meted out to a child is usually less severe
than that given to an adult for the same crime. To ensure that the punishment will not
have a permanent impact on the child's future, the child's record is expunged at the
age of majority. In light of this judicial leniency towards children, personal injury
statutes of limitations should also be more accommodating when applied to persons
sexually abused as children than they are for people sexually violated as adults.
The unique disabilities of children, the context of child sexual abuse, and the
continuing and debilitating effect of child sexual abuse present strong justifications
for greater scrutiny of these statutes. This type of statute of limitations should be
required, as were the statutes in Jeter, 23 Pickett, 2 4 and Mills, 25 to "be sufficiently
long in duration to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such
children to assert claims on their behalf." 126
The second prong of equal protection analysis that the Court employed in Jeter
was that "any time limitation placed on that opportunity [to sue for child support] must
be substantially related to the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or
115. Admittedly, the impact of sexual assault on adult victims may be severe. In one case study, a four-to-six-year
follow-up of 91 female adult victims, researchers found that 37% of the victims felt that they recovered in months, 37%
felt that it took years to recover, and 26% did not consider themselves recovered. Ferris, Long Term Consequences of
Adult Rape, 6 REsPONsE TO VtoLENCE IN THE FAMILY & SEXUAL ASSAULT 5 (1983).
116. Paulson, Strouse & Chaleff, supra note 60, at 42-43; Steele & Alexander, supra note 55, at 226-27.
117. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1364-66 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing trust relationship in
psychiatric and psychological transference phenomenon).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1365 (quoting testimony of clinical psychologist at trial).
120. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1978).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1914-15 (1988).
124. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 12-18 (1983).
125. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91. 98-101 (1982).
126. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. at 1914 (quoting Mills, 456 U.S. at 99-100).
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fraudulent claims." 127 In Pickett, the Court looked at the proof that would be offered
in paternity cases to determine if a short statute of limitations was necessary to avoid
stale or fraudulent claims. The Court stated: "We can conceive of no evidence essential
to paternity suits that invariably will be lost in only [two years], nor is it evident that
the passage of [twenty-four] months will appreciably increase the likelihood of fraud-
ulent claims." 128 A few months after Pickett, the Court used the same reasoning to
strike down a similar Michigan statute with a six-year limitation period. 129
The typical paternity claim such as the one in Pickett may be proved by blood
tests. 130 Child sexual abuse claims, however, are more difficult to prove and often
lack "objective, verifiable evidence." 1 31 Because physical evidence for these cases
is hard to get and disappears quickly, a tort statute of limitations for sexual abuse
based on the production of physical evidence would lead to extremely short
limitations periods of days, or even hours.
Production of physical evidence should not be a major concern for the courts in
evaluating tort statutes of limitations for child sexual abuse claims. Essentially, most
child sexual abuse cases involve a determination of the credibility of the parties. 132
There is nothing unique about cases being resolved by "swearing contests," as one
judge noted. 133 Oral contract disputes are typical "swearing contests." 134 These types
of disputes may extend back many years. In the context of a criminal sexual offense,
where the burden of proof is greater, the jury is usually permitted to base its decision
on the uncorroborated testimony of a child. ' 35 Therefore, in civil child sexual abuse
cases, courts should allow decisions to be made on the credibility of the parties.
Besides looking at the type of proof that would be offered, the Pickett Court
looked at the state interest in preventing fraudulent claims.13 6 The amount of time
between the abuse and the legal action may be significant in child sexual abuse
litigation for determining whether fraudulent claims are brought. However, the claim
should be analyzed in the context of the reasons for delay 37 rather than being
summarily dismissed. The passage of time may not be prejudicial to the civil
defendant.' 38 One author notes that the passage of time actually works to the
defendant's advantage, since juries will be suspicious of a plaintiff who brings her
action long after the alleged acts occurred. 139 As the Court in Clark noted, the fact
127. Id.
128. Pickett, 462 U.S. at 13-14 (citing Mills, 456 U.S. at 101).
129. Daniel v. Collier, 464 U.S. 805 (1983), vacating and remanding 113 Mich. App. 74, 317 N.W.2d 293 (1982)
(in light of Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983)).
130. Pickett, 462 U.S. at 11.
131. Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 82, 722 P.2d 226, 231 (1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 232.
134. Id.
135. "Only three jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, Nebraska, and New York, require the government to
provide corroboration in its prima facie case in prosecutions for all sex offenses committed upon children." ABMsED
Vicrats, supra note 36, at 103.
136. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 10 (1983).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 104-13.
138. See Hicks, Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REv. 627, 633-35 (1985).
139. Id. at 634.
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that most states have tolling statutes casts serious "doubt on the State's purported
interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims." 140 It is irrational to
allow a person sexually abused at age five to pursue a tort claim at age eighteen, while
at the same time denying access to the court to a twenty-two year old who was
sexually abused at eleven. The memory of an eleven year old is presumably greater
and more reliable than the memory of a five year old, and the time between the abuse
and the suit is shorter in the former case.
The Supreme Court has also stated that the state's interest in preventing the
prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims can be "undercut by [other] countervailing
state interest[s]. ' ' 4 1 These interests include the "desire to see that justice is done"
and to "ensur[e] that genuine claims" are satisfied. 142 The "desire to see that justice
is done" is particularly pertinent in child sexual abuse claims. The majority of sexual
offenses committed against children are not even reported, let alone prosecuted. 143 If
an individual is brought to trial, conviction is unlikely because of the difficult burden
of proof in criminal proceedings.144 The National Committee for the Prevention of
Child Abuse reports that "[i]n practical terms, sexual offenses against children go
unreported, unprosecuted, unconvicted; offenders and children go untreated; society
goes unprotected.' ' 145 The state has a valid interest in encouraging, rather than
discouraging, the bringing of genuine civil claims so that justice may be done.
There are strong reasons to conclude that a state's interest in preventing stale
claims is not "substantially related" to a short statute of limitations that treats
sexually abused children the same as sexually abused adults. Given the countervailing
state interests, 146 the special emotional characteristics of the child, 147 the presence of
the practical obstacles mentioned in Pickeu,148 and other obstacles unique to child
sexual abuse victims, 49 the Supreme Court when presented with the issue may
conclude that a short statute of limitations fails a "substantial basis" test and thus
violates equal protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current state personal injury statutes of limitations are typically short' 50 and do
not take into account the special obstacles to legal action unique to people sexually
140. Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1916 (1988).
141. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1. 10 (1983) (quoting Justice O'Connor in Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S 91, 103
(1982)).
142. Id.
143. A. RussELL & C. TRAINOR, supra note 41, at 13-19, 47; National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse,
Basic Facts About Sexual Child Abuse (1982).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 141-143.
147. See supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
149. See supra notes 37-78 and accompanying text.
150. Statutes of limitations for personal injuries range from one to six years in the United States. ALA. CODE § 6-2-39
(1975) (1 year); ALASKA STAT. § .09.10.070 (1983) (2 years); Atiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542(1) (1) (1982) (2 years);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-56-115 (1987) (5 years); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982) (1 year); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 13-80-102(a) (1987) (2 years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West Supp. 1988) (2 years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 8119 (1974) (2 years); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(4) (1981) (1 year); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95-11(3) (Vest 1982) (4 years);
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abused as children. 151 It is suggested here that, in light of Mills and subsequent cases,
statutes of limitations for actions based on sexual injuries to a child should be
extended six to ten years beyond the age of majority. This would allow for the
pdrsonal obstacles encountered by,152 and the traumatic psychological disorders
suffered by, 153 sexually abused children. Also, a six- to ten-year extension of the
limitations period would not be so long as to offend one's sensibilities or to seriously
prejudice potential defendants. Finally, the extension of these statutes for these cases
will help to ensure that "justice will be done" for victims of child sexual abuse.
James Wilson Harshaw 111*
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